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Prelimin ary -- Ct> Not C\,Jote 
Conduct, Performance, and Pllblic R:>licy Implications 
of Baseball's Reentry Draft 
This paper examines issues of theory and evidence regarding the link 
between baseball's reentry draft and league balance. The character of this 
relationship is imI;X>rtant in at least t11,1Q broad respects. First, fran the 
standpoint of public policy, events which potentially affect canpetitiveness 
in professional baseball are especially significant in light of the sport's 
rather curious antitrust inmunity. 1 second, though the redistributive impli-
cations of baseball's labor market have been set forth . quite clearly in the 
econanic literature, the conventional prediction that team balance will be 
unaffected by the reentry draft has not been tested. 
Section I provides background relating the issues of baseball's favored 
antitrust status and the econanic analysis of the sport. We touch briefly 
on the proffered rationale for baseball's exemption and then review the salient 
points in the econanic model of baseball's labor market. This sunmary serves 
to distinguish aspects of the traditional model which are sound fran those 
perhaps less so. In Section II we extend an alternative theory of the canpe-
titive effects of baseball's reentry draft originally suggested by Daly & 
lt:>ore [1981]. Section III presents and estimates an empirical model designed 
1saseball's inmunity stems rather circuitously fran the 1914 New York Supreme 
Court interpretation in .American League Baseball Club v. Chase. The basis 
for the court's judgment was that professional baseball at that time did 
not qualify as "a ccmrodity or an article of merchandise subject to the 
regulation of Congress on the theory that it is interstate carmerce". Cespite 
several mitigating developnents since then, the Courts have shown that they 
will rule in favor of baseball's exemption until Congress acts explicitly 
to revoke it. Congressional inquiry into this prospect was undertaken by 
the Sisk Comtittee as recently .as 1976. Though the · carmittee' s findings 
failed to justify baseball's exemption, no formal action was taken. For 
a IT'Ore detailed account of the judicial history, see Markham & Teplitz 
( 1981, pp. 1-9). 
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to test important tenets of the alternative theory. Section N discusses 
the policy significance of our findings and SUJgests directions for further 
research. 
I. Background & Review 
Broadly speaking, defende rs of baseball's antitrust exemption contend 
that the explicit league agreements afforded by its unique legal status are 
necessary to preserve the vitality of canpetition. For purposes of fina!lcial 
viability, the league requires such seeming cartel arrangements as jointly 
negotiated broadcasting contracts, intricate foonulas for sharing attendance 
revenue, and canplete control in granting new "canpetitors" the right of 
territorial monopoly. The rules governing the sport's labor market are even 
more controversial, defended as "pro-canpetitive" restraints on player 
mobility. For example, the reverse-order rookie draft is intended to give 
each year's 1,,0rst teams the first option on the best new talent. rurthermore, 
throUJh the "reserve clause" in rookie contracts, players are obligated to 
stay with their original club for a period standardized by the leag ue. 
AlthoUJh this draft system limits canpetitive bidding on new talent, and 
thus artificially suppresses the cost of potential superstars, this cost-saving 
can be especially vital in preserving otherwise extramarginal clubs. In 
these varied respects it has been argued .that fonnal agreements clearly in 
breach of antitrus t guidelines are necessary to assure team balance, financial 
integrity, and thus the general vitality of canpetition in our national 
pastime. 
In rather sharp contrast, econanic analysis finds rrost of these argunents 
untenable, especially the notion that the reserve clause has pro-canpetitive 
2 
implications. The traditional econanic view holds that the terms of the 
original reserve clause merely facilitated monoposonistic exploitation, without 
alterin;;1 the allocation of talent that would prevail in an auction market 
. 2 
for players. The CCX]ency of this argument follows fran t\oiO laoor market 
conditions implied by the reserve clause. First, it is essentially a provision 
that secures the property rights to playertalent with the owners. Second, 
clubs are nonetheless unilaterally free to sell, trade, or waive players. 
Since there is initially no canpetitive bidding for players, a club receives 
econanic rents via the revenue received fran relatively low cost personnel. 
Given the initial property-right assignments wroUJht in the rookie draft, 
and subsequently protected under the reserve clause, owners are in a p:>sition 
to extract the econanic rents of players either throUJh the tox office or 
the cash-player market. In short, the econanic model has long identified 
the reserve clause as simply a rent-seekin;;J • arranganent. Indeed, the model 
clearly predicted the dramatic escalation in player salaries that has occurred 
since the creation of the reentry draft in 1976. 3 The unprecedented contracts 
2The seminal discussion of this issue is Rottenberg's (1956, pp. 247-252). 
More formal treatments are presented by Quirk & El Hodiri (1971) and [Ermert 
(1973). A concise reveiw of the literature on this p:>int is provided by 
Daly & Moore (1981, pp. 78-79). 
3~ should emphasis that the re-entry draft represents a revision, not a 
repeal, of the reserve clause. Originally, the reserve clause assigned 
the property rights of a player to the team for the duration of the players 
professional career. The only real option for a disgruntled player prior 
to 1976 was to leave baseball for a season, after which time the player 
was free to negotiate with any club. This option was in fact taken by curt 
Flood in 1970 following an unfavorable U. s. Supreme Court ruling on Flood's 
appeal on the legality of the reserve clause. 1he basis for this decision 
was baseball's antitrust exemption. Under the revised reserve clause, a 
player is only obligated to his original team for six years. Then the player 
is eligible for the re-entry draft. 
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negotiated since that time reflect °' the redistribution of econanic rent fran 
. 4 
club owners to players. However, regarding the net reallocation of players, 
the econanic reasoning is that an owner unwilling to match a playe r's new 
contract as generated in the free-agent market, should have been quite willing 
to sell that player at a canparable premiun under the original reserve clause. 
Though the free-agent market clearly changes the profitability associated 
with management's decision, it does not alter the calculus. For this reason, 
the reentry draft is predicted to redistribute econanic rents, but not tale .nt, 
and thus team balance should be unaffected. 
¼hether team balance·has in fact been unaltered by the reentry market 
is an empirical question which has been relatively neglected in the econcmic 
literature. An exception is a recent paper by D::>lan & Schnidt (1984) which, 
contrary to the traditional prediction, found improvements in team revenue 
and field perfonnance positively correlated with player rqovanents in the 
free-agent market. However, we regard these findings as preliminary in two 
respects. First, the Spearman rank procedure performed is a univariate method-
ology which does not control for any of the other variables that might explain 
team revenue and field performance. Second , the ordinal ranking of free-agents 
within three broad quality c lassi fications reflects a subjective, albeit 
majority designation . Nevertheless, those preliminary findings are consistent 
with an alternative view of the reentry draft's implications suggested by 
Daly & Moore (1981) . The next section surnnarizes this view and then extends 
4The prediction of monopsonistic exploitation has been amply verified in 
the literature. Estimates of the rate of exploitation under the reserve 
clause are obtained by Scully ( 1974). Empirical estimates of the degree 
of rent redistribution since the re-entry draft are provided by Cassing 
& D::>uglas (1981), Sarrners & Quinton (1982), and Hill & Spellman (1983). 
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the analysis to obtain new short- and long-run predictions regarding the 
canpetitive implications of the reentry draft. 
II. Theoretical Reconsiderations 
As indicated above, a crucial link in the prediction of the traditional 
model is the assumption that any pro-canpetitive allocation of talent achieved 
.throt.gh the reverse-order rookie draft \o.Ould be ultimately undone via cash-
player transactions. 'Ihis ¼Ould seem to imply that cash-player deals should 
have been ccmnon, if not rampant, prior to the reentry draft. However, Daly 
& Moore (hereafter D & M) cite an apparent dearth of such transactions histori-
cally, and thus question the appropriateness of the traditional model for 
examining the canpetitive impacts of the reentry draft. 5 
D & M's reformulation proceeds £ran the carrnon pranise that close races 
6 enhance the aggregate wealth of the league. However, they reject the related 
proposition, as discussed by Cemnert { 1973), that efforts to capture the 
5111\ccording to press accounts, prior to 1976 and the prospective revision 
of the reserve clause, few, if any, players of star quality had been exchanged 
for cash since \~rld war II. Indeed , the Corrnissioner of Baseball's nullifi-
cation of a nunber of player sales by the oakland franchise in 1976, subse-
quently upheld by the courts, was explicitly based on the rationale that 
they were highly unusual and \o.Ould reduce the equality of canpetition •••• In 
short, casual empiricism {probably the best evidence we have) su;:igests that 
player- cash transfers are not the medium throt.gh which significant increments 
of talent are transacted •••. this custan raises serious questions about the 
descriptive or predictive accuracy of the conventional model for analyzing 
changes in the rules structure." {D & M, pp. 83-84) 
6eognizance of this point is manifest in the league policy of splitting gate 
receipts between hane and road clubs. Ho\o.ever, perhaps of greater significance 
is the role of national broadcasting contracts. These are negotiated jointly 
and shared equally . It is reasonable to prestrne that the value of the national 
contracts will depend on the level of national interest in the sport, sanething 
which is likely to vary direcly with the vigor of canpetiton. Hence, in 
terms of national broadcasting revenue, all teams have an equal interest 
in league balance. 
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joint benefits of league balance are necessarily thwarted for reasons endemic 
to the typical externality problem. 7 Instead, they stress special attributes 
of Baseball's envirorment which raise the liklehcx:x:l that significant .external 
wealth effects can be internalized. This unique setting is forcefully descibed · 
by D & M: 
" •••• team owners are surely aware of these (wealth) effects; the 
nunber of teams is not large and, hence, free-rider effects are 
not inevitable; a central organization ( the league) is available 
to coordinate activities and prescibe allocative rules; collusion 
anong teams is, uniguely, legal in the industry and detect ion of 
violators of collusive agreements remarkably easy." (pp. 81-82) 
Considered in this context, the explicit terms of the reverse-order rookie 
draft can be seen as a rather clear instance of how league rules are devised 
to incorporate the collective benefits associated with team balance. Further-
more, it is not even imperative that such agreeroents be explicit in light 
of baseball's facilitating institutional structure. Henc~, it is plausible 
that if the initial allocation of players rendered in the rookie draft is 
recognized as a significant step toward wealth-maximizing balance for the 
league, then an implicit contract not to undermine that allocation via cash-
player deals could be binding. Indeed, D & M maintain that just such an 
implicit "no sale" agreement was a rather well-known and time-honored tradition 
prior to revision of the the reserve clause in 1976. 8 
7111he situation is analogous to the traditional production externality pro-
blem. '!he improvement of a better than average team results in diseconanies · 
which• are external to t he club but internal to the league. Likewise, the 
improvement of a poor team results in benefits to the league as a whole over 
and above those which accrue to that individual club. It can not be expected 
that the club wil l consider these ext ernal effec ts of its decisions in deter-
mining the level of ~ts team's quality" (Demnert 1973, p. 29). 
8oa1y & t-bore (1981. p. 82-83), especially notes 5, 7, and 8. 
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In sum, the conspicuous absense of cash-player deals prior to 1976 may 
reflect the effectiveness with which league rules, both explicit and implicit, 
....ork to internalize the collective wealth effects identified with greater 
league balance . However, it is also likely that a major rule change such 
as the reentry draft could be a destabilizirg shock to the implicit contractual 
envirorment described above. In the conclusions of our ea rlier paper, we 
canmented that the crucial effect of the reentry draft may have been to reduce 
the perceived benefits of implicit cooperation while raising the costs of 
implementation. ~is conclusion is based on several findings or observations 
with respect to the [X)st reentry draft pericx:1. First, the intensity of bidding 
on premier players by several clubs in the ree ntry draft testifies to sane 
erosion of an apparent "no-sale" custan. Second, it is _note\toOrthy that the 
free-agent contracts have had a significant slipstream effect on base.ball's 
salary structure in general. Third, accordirg to the findings of our earlier 
paper, measureable improvements in revenue and field perfonnance correlated 
with the movrnent of free-agent talent fran 1977-198.3. Thm.gh we regard this 
finding as preliminary for the reasons cited in Section I , it does indicate 
a profit incentive for an individual tean to explore the prospects of the 
free-agent input market. 
Still, these points alone do not undetmine an arguably powerful rationale 
! 
that the owners \toOuld still be collectively better off if they simply agreed 
to abstain f ran the financial fray of the free agent market , much in the 
way that cash-player deals had been eschewed in the past. That this policy 
has apparently not been implemented leads us to hypothesize that the crucial 
effect of a well-organized auction market for proven major league talent 
may have been to raise the cost of detection and enforcement of an implicit 
7 
agreenent. 'Ihis concept represents an interesting extension of the D & M 
model and can be develped more fully to render new predictions regarding 
the short and long-run implications of the reentry draft. 
In our view, the reentry player draft is potentially disruptive because 
. 
it lends a greater degree of anonymity to player transactions. Anon:x'ftlity 
in this setting is important since it makes detection and thus enforcement 
of implicit agreements more difficult. 9 In essence, the reentry draft 
elevates a cash-player transaction fran a two- to a multi-party event. Fran 
a seller's standpoint, it is quite simply no longer a club's decision. Players 
decide to be free-agents. On the danand side, blame among clubs is also 
rather intractable. Cne bid does not an auction make, and when as many as 
a dozen clubs exercise their option to negotiate with a player, it is inappro-
priate to view the successful bidder as wholly culpable. In sun, it is hard 
to enforce an implicit anti~raid agreenent when the raid ceases to be a clear 
two-party transaction. As cartel theory predicts, an agreenent without means 
of detection is less enforceable and consequently more prone to violation. 
This analysis su:_Jgests an increased likelihood that the reentry draft 
will alter canpetitive balance. Balance in this context can be interpreted 
as revenue and/or field performance, since the t'tA'.) are highly correlatect. 10 
Indeed, it is the extra revenue that canes with winning, coupled with the 
perception that a free-agent might make the difference between winning a 
pennant and merely contending for one, that poses the initial incentive to 
91he general significance of these points for effective collusive conduct 
w~s discussed by Stigler (1968) and are well accepted in the literature. 
lOFor example, Scully' s revenue model predicts that the financial implication 
for a club playing .500 versus .600 baseball is more than one million 1972 
dollars (1974, pp. 920-921). 
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defect. Here again the analysis broaches an established tenet of cartel theory 
there must be sufficient rewards to entice defectors. For this reason, 
it is necessary to refine our preliminary assessment of the role which 
free-agent movanents may have had on team performances. The strength ·of 
this relationship yields sane measure of the incentive to cheat. In SLIT\, 
the short-run prediction of the alternative model is that canpetition should 
be affected, for which both the motivation and evidence are rneasureable impacts 
of free-agent activity on team revenue and field performances. Estima.tion 
of these effects is largely the focus of Section III. 
This theoretical perspective also has longer-run implcations which we 
should develop briely. Generally, we i,.,ould anticipate efforts to restrike 
a collusive agreenent, implicit or explicit. The basis for this hyothesis 
canbines several i;x,ints. First of all, imi;:ortant facets of the league arrange-
ment which encourage cooperation ranain intact. The ti,.,o most significant 
of these are the legality of explicit collusion and the fact the team balance 
remains the wealth-maximizing strategy for the league. Close can.petitions 
are not only a significant predictor of attendence revenue, but may heighten 
interest in the si;:ort in general. 11 This latter effect can be especially 
rel evant in determining national broadcasting contracts, the reve~ues fran 
which are shared equally . In a more theoretical context, we also emphasize 
that any disruption of a pre-1976 implicit contract due to the free-agent 
draft, will play out in a multi-period setting. Time adds a very important 
dimension in this case. Although there are always individual incentives 
11For example, Hunt & Lewis (1976, pp. 937-938) found the number of games 
behind the leader to be significant in explaining a team's hone and road 
attendance. 
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to cheat on a collusive agreement, there are also predictable joint conse-
quences of doing so. 12 Indeed, this is the point so ccgently conveyed in 
the well-known "prisoners' dilemna" •13 However, the dilemna is most vexing 
in a single-trial setting with no cannunication between prisoners. In 
contrast, the lessons . afforded by repetitions of the game reinforce rather 
than undennine the rationale for collective action. Therefore, we of fer 
the longer-run prediction that steps will be taken by league members to 
reinstate a policy paralleling the implicit "no sale" contract that apparently 
existed prior to the reentry draft. Indeed, one sign that league sentiments 
to this effect may have already surfaced is the issue of team ccmpensation 
for players lost in the reentry process. Recall that this was a critical 
issue behind the player strike which interrupted the 1981 season. Generally 
speaking, manifestations of any renewed league agreement in the longer term 
should appear in the nature and intensity of activity in the free agent 
market. Further consideration of this long-run hypothesis is given in our 
concluding ccmnents. 
12For a concise graphical treatment of this point, see Asch (1983, pp. 61-63) • 
13For a detailed discussion of this game and related extensions, see Luce 
& Raiffa (1957, pp. 94-102). 
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III. The Empirical Model and Results 
This section presents an empirical framework within which to test for 
changes in ccrnpetitive balance bet\>.€en pre- and post-reentry draft eras, 
1969-76 and 1977-83 respectively. 14 Changes in canpeti ton as they relate 
to free-agent novments are assessed in tenns of affects on teams' total rev-
enue. In a purely accounting sense, an individual team's annual revenue 
(REV) is derived fran five potential sources: 15 
where 






= attendance revenue, 
= concessions revenue, 
= local broadcast revenue, 
= shared national broadcast revenue, and 
= p:,st-season attendance and concessions revenue. 
This identity serves a useful organizational purpose quite separate 
fran is accounting function per se. our objective is discerning whether, 
and to what extent, a revenue incentive exists for owners to bid in the free-
agent market. For this reason, we may :irrmediately ignore sane of the revenue 
sources listed in equation (1 ) . For example, national broadcastin;J revenue 
is shared equally each year. Hence, free-agent activity will in no way alter 
the distribution of this revenue ccrnponent across teams. ve also exclt.de 
141969-76 provides an eight-year time span canparable in duration to the seven 
seasons since the inception of the reentry draft (1977-83). These fifteen 
years mark the full history of baseball since the sport reorganized into 
four divisions. A minor canplication of the period is the introduction of 
two new teams, Seattle and Toronto, for the 1977 season. For consistency, 
we have dropped these teams fran our sample and have recalculated all winning 
percentages in terms of the original 24 teams. 
15These revenue figures are closely guarded by many of the teams. The manner 
and success of our revenue estimation are described in detail in tolan and 
SChnidt, 1984. 
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J:X)St-season revenue fran consideration, but for a more interesting reason. 16 
For our purposes revenue estimation focuses on AREV, CREV, and BREVL. 
E:ach of these cantonents will, to varying degrees, be influenced by factors 
such as on-field perfonnance (both current and recent past), size of · the 
market, and intensity of fan interest. . In addition, the gain and/or loss 
of free agents during the 1977-83 period can influence team revenue both 
indirectly through their marginal contribution to team performance, and 
directly if they provide a turnstyle draw as "superstars". 
Consider these revenue sources in rnore detail. AREV and CREV are both 
obviously related to attendance itself. 'Ihe basic sports attendance equation 
has been estimated in several studies, and aspects of our ITOdel are predicated 
UJ:X)n that \o.Ork.17 Fonnally: 
( 2) AREV+cREV = f [WFCT( +), COOTENDER( +), CELLAR(-), TSA( +), TKBB( +), 
PI'IUJERG(+), HIITERG(+), Yl981(-), TIME(?), SMSA(+), 
FANS(+), BBCOOP(-), STADIUM(+), INCITY(?)]; 
16 Teams not involved in J:X)St-season play receive no J:X)St-season attendance 
or concessions revenue, while participating teams receive equal shares for 
each game they play. Furthennore, the amounts are sizable. For the 1969-83 
seasons, the ~rld series winners have averaged post-season revenues of ap-
proximately two million 1983 dollars. This represents approximately 11 percent 
of their total revenue for the year. A major issue, then, is getting into 
the playoffs. Finishing one game back represents substancial foregone rev-
enue. In short, a contender may have the greatest incentive to shop in the 
free agent market. Not only can a team acquire a proven player, it can also 
shop to fill a -weak position. 'rtle free agent could provide just the marginal 
irnprovanent necessary to win the division for an already solid team. While 
this is true, estimation of this imtortant revenue impact introduces estimation 
difficulties beyond the scope of the present effort. Bear in mind, however, 
that our retorted revenue incentives will likely understate the revenue impact 
of free agents. Of course, this is also true of all studies in the rent 
redistribution literature cited in note 4. 
17The prototype treatment of this estimation is provided by Noll (1974). 
Variations on this thane appear in Scully (1974) and Hunt & Lewis (1976). 
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where parenthetically we note predicted positive, negative, or indeterminant 
effects on attendance and concessions revenue. This specification posits 
that, ceteris paribus, fans turn out to see a winning team, and/or a team 
that is in the thick of a divisional race. These affects are roodeled con-
tinuously through winning percentage (WPCT) and with a binary variable relect-
ing whether or not a team is in contention (CONTENDER= 1 for teams finish-
ing five or fewer games behind the divisional winner; else= 0). Similarly, 
fans may show significantly less interest when a team is clearly out o( the 
race (CEUAR = l for teams finishing twenty or more games back~ else = 0). 
R:>wer hitting and rower pitching may also attact fans independent of their 
af feet on team performance. These effects are incorporated thr0t.gh team 
slugging averages (TSA) and team strike-to-walk ratios (TKBB) •18 A binary 
(Yl981) is included to allow for reduced revenue fran the strike-shortened 
1981 season. ~ also include a TIME variable to test for a secular trend 
which sane observers maintain has occurred in baseball attendence over the 
f "f 19 past 1 teen years. 
The addition of free agents to a roster can have two revenue effects. 
At least by design, they should influence revenue indirectly through their 
impact on team performance (WPCT). More will be said about this shortly. 
But newly acquired "superstars" may also lend an elanent of theatre, thus 
providing a turnstyle draw quite distinct fran their playing contribution. 
18An analogous situation for individual players was estimated by?, ? who dis-
covered that the most i;:owerful variables for explaining salary differentials 
wi9e slugging average for hitters and strikeout-to-walk ratio for pitchers. Early in the 1970's, there was sane concern that baseball was on the way 
out as our national pastime, losing ground to professional football. Others 
contend that, if this ever was true, interest in baseball nonetheless has 
shown renewed exuberance since the late 1970' s. To capture this possible 
trend, TIME is entered quadratically. 
13 
The free-agent variables included explicitly in the revenue estimation are 
PITCHERG and HI'ITERG. These are cunulative indices of free-agent acquisitions 
of pitchers and hitters, r espec tively. F.ach player's index value is calculated 
as a three-year weighted average (year of the draft is 0.6 , prior year is 
0. 3, and two years prior is O .1) of the proEX)rtion of games played times 
a quality measure. As defended previously, the quality measure of a player 
we adopt is slu;;;ging average for hitters and strikeout-to-walk ratio for 
pitchers. The proEX)rtion of games played is a refinement of baseball's classi-
fication of free agents into type "C" SEX)t players, type 11B11 everyday players, 
and tn;e "A" superstars. The denaninator for hitters is simply a full season, 
normally 162 games. For pitchers, the denaninator is based UEX)n the largest 
three-year average number of appearances by any starter ( 36, Mike 'Ibrrez 
1975-77) or reliever (72, Rollie Fingers 1974-76). The resulting indices 
provide objective, continuous estimates of the potential impact of free agents 
on a team's future. 20 
Special characteristics of a team's market may also explain variation 
in attendance. Certainly the population of the metropolitan area (SMSA) 
provides an unambiguous measure of a team's attendance base. But smaller 
cities can (and sane do) canpensate by having particularly rabid FANS. FANS 
is our estimate of per capita baseball attendance when the team plays 500 
20Along these lines, it is of interest to note that the largest index value 
for any pitcher is 3.03 (Rollie Fingers in the 1976 draft) while that for 
hitters is for 0.48 (Dave Winfield in the 1980 draft). The largest aggre-
gate index values for individual teams are pitcher gains, 4 .03 ·( California 
in the 1980 draft); pitcher losses, 3.32 (New York Yankees in 1980); hitter 
gains, 1.12 (California in 1976); and hitter losses, 1.81 (oakland in 1976). 
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ball. 21 This observation ranged fran 0.27 for the Yankees to 1.5 games 
attended annually per resident of Cincinnati. However, the existence of 
a second team in a metroi;olitan area may reduce the impact of a i;opulation 
base, especially if the other team is roore successful. The impact of other 
baseball franchises (BBCCMP) is considered as zero for single-team cities, 
and ( l + W1:CI' i) of the other local team two-team cities ( New York, Chicago, 
Los Angeles-Anaheim, and San Francisco-Oakland). A team's STADIUM size may 
also be important in the extrene case of success. A small stadiun repre~ent 
a supply constraint for a given level of demand, while a larger stadium allows 
a cushion for banner years. Finally, the nl.ltl.ber of years the team has been 
in the city (INCITY, taking on the values 1-5, 6 or m::>re) has an ambiguous 
effect on attendance. The enthusiasm of a new team may wear off after several 
years, or conversely, it may take sane years to build allegiances. 
Local broadcasting revenue is set in single or multi-year contracts. 
Accordingly, the perfonnance measures of interest are those of the team's 
recent past. VE model this with a three-year weighted average winning per-
<:=entage (WPCT3YR) and the number of pennants won over the past three seasons 
( P3YR). 22 Free-agent gains ( PITCHERG, HITIERG) are generally known at the 
time of negotiation and, as in the case of Pete .R::>se, could be a major factor 
21These predictions resulted fran a separate time series (1969-83) regres-
sion for each team. Per capita attendance, calculated as total attendance 
for all teams in the metroi;olitan area divided by SMSA size, was regressed 
on winning percentage (entered in cubic form) and INCITY (as defined in the 
text) • The Cochrane-Orcutt technique was anployed to correct for serial 
correlation in these regressions. 
FANS was then calculated by applying the estimated coefficients to a break-
even, 500 season instead of actual WPCT and 6 instead of INCITY. FANS provides 
a measure of stable fan interest over the entire pericd. It subsumes many 
other factors which sane authors deem influential in determining attendance. 
Included among these are per capita incane, percent of the population who 
a2~ black, as well as intangible sports interest. ~3YR = [.6(WFC'I't-l) + .3(WPCTt_2) + .l(WFC'I't_3)]/ 3. 
15 
in broadcast revenues. In addition many of the rnar-ket variables discussed 
above should also influence the contract. Thus local broadcasting revenue 
is specificed as: 
( 3) BREVL = f [WPCT3YR( +) , P3YR( +) , PITCHERG( +), HITTERG( +), 
SMSA(+), BBCCMP(-), FANS(+)]. 
our estimation of season r-evenue (SRE.V, measured in thousands of 1983 
dollars) is then obtained by adding Equations 2 and 3 to yield a reduced-form 
expression. Since overlapping variables have the same hypothesized sign 
in both equations, predictions are unaffected. Equation (3} was estimated 
thro~h least squares regression by using the 24 teams overt the 15 years 
as a panel data set. Serial correlation was corrected thro~h the Cochrane-
Orcutt technique with the first-order autocorellation coefficient estimated 
at 0.82 ( t-value of 26.1). The results of this estimation are presented 
as Fquation (4}. 
(4) SRE.V = -4629.20 + 13.65 WPCT + 351.50 CONTENDER - 50.08 CELIAR 
(0.58) (5.30**) (1.51) (0.22) 
+ 10.21 TSA - 5.19 TKBB + 75.99 PITCHERG + 412.53 HITTERG 
(2.47**) (0.01) (0.51) (0.81) 
- 4775.71 Yl981 - 2137.51 TIME+ 111.24 TIME2 + 0.94 SMSA 
(16.69**) (2.21*} (3.04**) (3.56**) 
+ 5538.98 FANS - 644.68 BBCa-tP + 114.31 STADIUM - 529.39 INCITY 
(2.83**) (0.74} (4.05**) (1.65) 
+ 14.31 WPCT3YR + 324.78 P3YR 
(3.39**) (1.33) 
The R2 for this equation is 0.64. The values in parentheses ar-e t-values, 
with a single asterisk depicting significance at the five-percent level and 
a double asterisk at the one-percent level. 
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Based on these results, does an owner have a clear revenue incentive 
to get involved in the reentry draft? The answer is "no" if one is counting 
on turnstyle effect. Both PITCHERG and HITIERG are positive, but insignifi-
cant. However, the return could be great if free agents truly have the anti-
cipated impact on WFCT. Note that WFCT is highly significant and carries 
a substantial revenue impact. For example, a team achieving a record one 
standard deviation ( 69-points} above the mean winning percentage of 500, 
raises revenue by $941,850. In other lf.Ords, it is If.Orth almost $1 miilion 
to play 569 versus 500 ball. The question remains, however, do free agents 
affect winning? This relationship will be examined shortly in F.quations 
{5} and (6) . Before turning to that estimation, consider briefly the other 
determinants of the season's revenue. Raising three-year winning by its 
standard deviation 59 r:oints should increase revenue by another $143,087 
in the future. However, having controlled for WFCT, a team's position in 
the divisional race (CCNrENDER or CELLAR) appears insignificant. So are 
a team's strikeout-to-walk ratio, canpetition from other teams in the area, 
length of ti.me in the city, and the number of pennants If.On in the last three 
years. Power-hitting teams do fare dramatically better, however. Raising 
TSA by a standard deviation (e.g., fran the average 379 to to 407) should 
raise revenue by $285,880. t-bving to a city (SMSA) with one million more 
people could increase revenue by $9 39 , 648, unless thos e FANS average O .17 
fewer trips to a park in a normal year. In that case, the team lf.Ould break 
even, ceteris paribus. Pdding 10,000 seats onto a stadium is projected to 
bring in $1,143,140. As an aside, observe that the 1981 players' strike 
is predicted to have cost $4,775,710 per team in foregone revenue. Finally, 
seasonal revenue appears to have declined thro1.ghout the entire period, but 
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at a decreasing rate. ~ note, however, that offsetting these revenue declines 
is a recent trend of rising national broadcasting contracts. 
r-bw consider the impact of free agent activity on field performance. 
OJr model postulates that a team's winning percentage (WPCT) is determined 
by the previous year's stock of playing talent (represented by last year's 
winning percentage) plus personnel changes during the off-season. Of inmediate 
interest are the free-agent gains and losses (PITCHERG, HI'ITERG, PITCHERL, 
HITTERL) that occur during the second half of our time perioct. 23 Formally: 
( 5) WFCT = f [WPCTt-l ( +) , PITCHERG( + ) , HITTERG( +) , PITCHERL(-), PLAY'ERL(-)] • 24 
This equation was estimated in the same manner as F.quation 4 with the 
following results. 
23Missing fran this formulation are the less accessible personnel changes -
retiranents, rookie additions, and trades. If anything, the exclusion of 
this information should bias our estimates against free agents affecting 
team performance. The reasoning is simple. Teams can attempt to improve 
thanselves in any or all of three ways -- by developing their · own rookies 
throUJh their farm system, throUJh trades, or throUJh the reentry dr-aft. 
The coefficients on free agent gains are estimated by canparing changes in 
winning percentage of teams actively involved in the draft visa vie teams 
who are not. If, as seems reasonable, teams who are mor-e active in the draft 
are a l so less active in utilizing the other tv.u modes, then the lack of 
adequate control for the other modes will bias the free agent coefficients 
downward. 
24This formulation differs fran the production-function rendering catm:mly 
found in the rent-redistribution literature. There, current performance 
is estimated to be a function of current team aggregates, such as team batting 
average, slu;Jging average, earned run average, and strikeout-to-walk ratio. 
An individual's contribution to team performance is then calculated as their 
prorated share of a team aggregate times that aggregate's impact on winning. 
While this formulation is appropriate in calculating the value of a player's 
marginal product, it is not appropriate for our purposes. That is, a newly 
acquired free agent plays in place of another player, and a free agent lost 
is replaced by a different player. ~ are interested in determining free 
agents' marginal impacts over the other players. 
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(6) WFCT = 132.46 
(7.19**) 
+ 0.74 WFCTt-l + 8.66 PITCHERG + 20.73 HITIERG 
(20.23**) (1.95*) (1.18) 
- 11.67 PITCHERL - 27.39 HITIERL 
(2.20*) (1.67*) 
The ·R2 for the equation is 0.58. The results indicate that a team which 
has neither acquired nor lost free agents starts out with a winning percentage 
of 132 and then adds on 74% of its winning percentage fran last year. Thus 
an average team (WPCT of 500) fran last year is predicted to remain average 
this year (WPCT of 502). Adding pitchers throt.gh the draft is predicted 
to improve winning percentage, but adding hitters has no statistically sign-
ificant impact. on the other hand, losing pitchers or hitters to the draft 
is detrimental to the ensuing season. To get an idea of the impact on WFCT 
and SREV, consider the effects of gaining (or losing) the best pitcher and 
hitter during the free-agent period. Rollie Fingers ( 1976 draft) · is estimated 
to be the best pitcher to enter the draft and sign with another club. His 
index value of 3.027 implies a rise of 26 points in his new team's winning 
percentage (revenue gain of $354,900) but a dec line of 35 points to his old 
team ($477,750). Dave Winfield, with an index value of 0.485, appears to 
be the best hitter of the pericx:1. .Adding a player of his calibre to a team 
is predicted raise winning percentage by 10 points ($136,500) while his loss 
by a team will cost 13 points ($177,450). While not statistically significant, 
the free-agent coefficients fran the revenue equation provide the best point 
estimates of their turnstile effects. The turnstile draw of Rollie Fingers 
is predicted to have been $230,022 for a total revenue increase of $584,922. 
Dave Winfield's direct effect on the gate is estimated at $200,077 for a 
total of $336,577. Q'lce again, we stress that such impacts will be under-
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stated, perhaps dramatically, should these players have made the difference 
in getting their respective teams into the playoffs. 
IV. ·surrnary and Conclusions 
A fundamental difference exists between the traditional model of 
baseball's labor .market and the alternative model developed in this paper. 
The alternative view emphasizes joint rather than individual wealth-maximizing 
conduct, the rationale for which is strengthened by the league's institutional 
structure and protected by baseball's unique legal status. Contrary to the 
traditional rrodel, the reentry draft is predicted to have canpetitive impacts. 
The basis for this prediction is that the reentry draft obscures detection 
of violators of an implicit agreement and thus encourages defections. Of 
course, there must also be a sufficient lure for defectors. In the case 
of baseball, that incentive is p::,sited as the revenue gains that may be attri-
buted to free-agent movements. Our results indicate that free-agents have 
had substantial revenue impacts, ceterius paribus, both for teams gaining 
and losing their services. J:efined in this financial context, canpetitive 
balance does appear to have been altered. Furthennore, this revenue effect 
can be interpreted as an incentive for owners to bid in the reentry auction, 
and, accordingly, a source for cartel instability. 
However, whether the revenue additions justify the spectacular salaries 
of recent years is quite another story. In a casual sense, we w::>uld sunnise 
probably not. Indeed, realization of this likely fact should reaffirm the 
wisdan of joint wealth-maximizing conduct. This reasoning leads us to the 
longer-tenn prediction for league conduct which was raised at the close of 
Section II. Recall that, considering the learning process that occurs in 
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Selected Measures of Free-.Agent Act ivity by Draft Year 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total Free 23 31 29 32 37 36 28 
.Agents 
Total Signing 22 30 22 27 32 16 16 
With New Team 
Total Staying l 1 7 5 5 20 12 
With Old Team 
Pct Staying 4% 3% 24% 16% 14% 56% 43% 
With Old Team 
CUrnulative Index 8 . 65 13.12 13.00 15. 51 12 .76 6.05 6 . 70 
of Pitchers 
CUrnulative Index 4 . 47 4.03 2 . 55 3 .32 5.19 2.58 3 . 02 
of Hitters 
an in t e r-t emporal game setting, we hypothesized a settling trend in the nature 
and intensi t y of free-agent activi t y . Sane very preliminary evidence that 
this t r end may be occurring is presented in the above table. There , various 
measures desc r ibe the quant ity and quality of f r ee agent activity for each 
year of the reentry draft. ct>serve that the general trend in the market 
i s for it to rise and then subside . This trend is discernable in both the 
qual ity and quanti t y of activity . Also note the rising pr opor tion of free 
agents signing with their original teams . Admittedly , the results presented 
aoove are rather cursory , but they are suggestive of directions for future 
research. For example, other rrore revealing indicies of t his fOSSible trend 
....ould be the value of contracts negotiated as well as t he average nunbe r 
of teams bi dding and number of bids · per player. 
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